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I. INTRODUCTION
1

The Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzalez v. Crosby creates a
framework in which state prisoners who are denied federal habeas relief may invoke Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
seek review of the decision without impermissibly circumventing 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s restrictions on second or successive habeas petitions (“SSHPs”). Gonzalez creates a more concrete analysis based on
the nature of the relief sought by the petitioner, while also addressing
some of the concerns of equity raised by an overly broad interpretation of the restrictions that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) places on successive petitions for federal
habeas relief.
In 1963, the Supreme Court wrote that “[c]onventional notions of
finality of litigation have no place where life or liberty is at stake and
2
infringement of constitutional rights is alleged.” The notion now
seems almost quaint. On April 24, 1996, a year after the April 19th
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City,
3
President Clinton signed AEDPA into law. As an attempt by Congress to address the dual threats of foreign and domestic terrorism,
the bill was widely recognized as a failure: before approving the
measure by a narrow majority, the House of Representatives stripped
the bill of several counterterrorism provisions, particularly those that
sought to expand the authority of the Federal Government to use
*
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Thank you to Professor Catherine T. Struve for her help in selecting this topic. Thank
you to Professor Struve and Rachel Flipse, J.D ‘10, for their help in preparing this article
for publication.
545 U.S. 524 (2005).
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963).
See Alison Mitchell, Clinton Signs Measure on Terrorism and Death Penalty Appeals, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 25, 1996, at A18; see also David Johnston, Clues Are Lacking: U.S. Officials Scurry for Answers—Reno to Ask Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1995, at A1 (describing the initial investigation into the Oklahoma City bombing).
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4

wiretaps. At the same time, the families of crime victims (particularly
the families of the victims of the Oklahoma City bombing) celebrated
the bill’s passage. Believing that AEDPA would ensure swift justice
for the accused bombers and other prisoners convicted of capital
crimes, these families had pressured Congress over the course of the
5
bill’s development.
AEDPA greatly restricts the ability of state prisoners to proceed
with a successive habeas petition, even if the successive petition raises
a new claim or introduces evidence not presented in an initial peti6
tion for habeas relief. State prisoners who wish to submit an SSHP
must first seek the permission of the court of appeals, and the appellate court may grant permission only under certain narrowly defined
7
conditions. Some state prisoners have attempted to circumvent
these restrictions by relying on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b),
which allows parties to seek relief from a final judgment on grounds
such as clerical error, fraud or misrepresentation by government
agents, or the discovery of new evidence not previously discoverable
8
with “reasonable diligence.” While the plain language of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244 bars the use of SSHP under most circumstances, the applicability of Rule 60(b) to habeas proceedings has not received quite as
much focus.
This Comment addresses the question in three parts. The first
section briefly reviews the statutory framework surrounding the use of
Rule 60(b) in habeas proceedings. The second section looks at cases
through which the federal courts had tried to develop a workable
standard for applying Rule 60(b) to the habeas process: while some
4
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Stephen Labaton, House Passes Narrow Counterterrorism Bill Unlike Senate’s, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
15, 1996, at A18; see also 142 CONG. REC. 7554 (1996) (statement of Sen. Biden) (arguing
that AEDPA’s restrictions on habeas corpus were less likely to deter potential terrorists
than the expanded investigative powers that the House had stripped from the bill); id. at
7558 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (commiserating with Sen. Biden’s frustration regarding
the absence of certain provisions while advocating for the bill’s passage).
See, e.g., Julie DelCour, Victims’ Survivors Speak out to Urge Curbs on Appeals, TULSA WORLD
(Okla.), Feb. 1, 1996, at A1 (discussing victims’ relatives mission to “stop lengthy inmate
death-row appeals”). The rapidly approaching anniversary of the attack was very much
on the minds of the Senators as they gathered to discuss the conference report. Compare
142 CONG. REC. 7548 (1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (noting that Senate consideration
of the conference report on AEDPA coincided with the one-year anniversary of the Oklahoma City bombing), with id. at 7552 (statement of Sen. Biden) (observing that Congress
had not felt any urgency to address these questions in the months prior to the pending
anniversary).
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) § 106(b), 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(2) (2006).
Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
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circuits concluded that the rule had no place in the habeas process,
and treated a motion under the rule as an attempt by state prisoners
to circumvent the provisions of AEDPA, others believed that a petitioner filing a Rule 60(b) motion sought a form of relief entirely different from a petitioner who filed an SSHP. These courts held a
much broader view of the rule’s use in the context of habeas proceedings.
Ultimately, a synthesis doctrine emerged out of the Eleventh Circuit that reconciled these conflicting policies. First articulated by
Judge Gerald Tjoflat in a dissent to an Eleventh Circuit opinion, this
doctrine distinguishes between Rule 60(b) motions that seek to advance a claim which are barred as successive attempts by State prisoners to attack their trial court convictions, and true Rule 60(b) motions which seek review of the habeas process itself. The Supreme
Court affirmed this doctrine in Gonzalez, and the Court’s decision
provides a basis for courts to examine a Rule 60(b) motion seeking
review of a decision to deny habeas relief.
The final section of this comment discusses the impact of Gonzalez,
relying on a 2009 decision in the Ninth Circuit to demonstrate how
the application of Rule 60(b) to the habeas process addresses fears
that an overly broad reading of AEDPA may restrict the ability of state
prisoners to raise legitimate issues regarding the process by which a
district court denied their original applications for habeas relief.
II. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
A. The Availability of Habeas Relief to State Prisoners
Habeas corpus is one of the fundamental privileges outlined in
9
the Constitution. In its original incarnation, however, federal habeas
relief was contemplated only for prisoners who were “in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or . . . [who
10
were] committed for trial before some court of the same.” In 1867,
9

10

“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless where in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
There was little debate over whether a guarantee of habeas corpus should be included in
the Constitution; most discussion focused on how broadly the guarantee should be
granted. Compare 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 438 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (debating whether the suspension of habeas corpus should only be permitted “on the most urgent occasions,” or whether the right of habeas corpus should be
held “inviolable”) with id. at 345–50 (deliberating over the nature, scope and wording of
the Constitution’s provisions addressing treason).
Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 659 (1996) (quoting Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1
Stat. 82 (establishing the United States judicial courts)).
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Congress expanded the doctrine of habeas corpus to include “all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the [C]onstitution, or of any treaty or law of the United
States,” thereby providing State prisoners an opportunity to seek re11
lief at the federal level.
B. Federal Habeas Relief for State Prisoners (28 U.S.C. § 2254)
The statutory procedures by which a state prisoner may seek ha12
beas relief in the federal courts are described in 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A
prisoner convicted in the state courts must exhaust all potential remedies at the state level before a federal district court may entertain a
13
petition for habeas relief. There is a presumption at the federal level that a state court decision is correct, and the burden rests on the
petitioner to rebut this presumption by clear and convincing evi14
dence. A § 2254 petitioner may not appeal a final order in a habeas
proceeding unless “a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability,” finding that the applicant “has made a substantial show15
ing of the denial of a constitutional right.” The Supreme Court later clarified that a § 2254 petitioner may seek an appeal of a final
judgment in a habeas proceeding by showing “at least, that jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid
claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its
16
procedural ruling.” In clarifying this burden, the Supreme Court
referenced both a claim relying on the denial of a “constitutional
11

12

13

14
15
16

Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385, quoted in Felker, 518 U.S. at 659. But see Ex parte
Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 118 (1944) (requiring that a petitioner seeking habeas relief in the
federal courts exhaust state proceedings as a threshold matter). Supreme Court affirmation of the exhaustion requirement was later codified by statute in 1948. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 (1952).
“The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain
an application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . [for a prisoner held pursuant to a State
court judgment] only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution
or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). Of course, if no corrective remedies are available at the
state level, or if “circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the
rights of the applicant,” a federal district court may still entertain an application for a writ
of habeas corpus. Id. § 2254(b)(1)(B).
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Id. § 2253(c).
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “The writ of habeas corpus plays a vital role
in protecting constitutional rights. In setting forth the preconditions for issuance of
a . . . [Certificate of Appealability] under § 2253(c), Congress expressed no intention to
allow trial court procedural error to bar vindication of substantial constitutional rights on
appeal.” Id. at 483.

Nov. 2010]

RULE 60(b) IN HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

211

right,” and a challenge raised against the underlying integrity of the
habeas process. This distinction became important as courts began
to consider the application of Rule 60(b) motions to habeas proceedings.
C. AEDPA’s Bar on Successive Habeas Petitions (28 U.S.C. § 2244)
By enacting, and later amending, 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Congress
voiced its specific concerns about abuse of the writ of habeas corpus
17
by state prisoners. Under this provision, habeas claims previously
18
raised before the district court are, on their face, dismissed. If a
claim was not raised previously, the petitioner must show that the
claim “relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to
cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
19
unavailable” to the district court. Alternatively, the petitioner must
show that the underlying facts of the claim could not have been discovered through due diligence, and that they show, by clear and convincing evidence, that “no reasonable factfinder” could have con20
victed the petitioner but for the asserted constitutional error.
Because § 2244(b)(2) explicitly contemplates the use of previously
unavailable evidence by a petitioner submitting an SSHP, the absence
of such a provision in § 2244(b)(1) suggests that the “mere” discovery
of new evidence is insufficient to allow a federal court to review a previously presented habeas claim.
Permission to present an SSHP must be granted by a court of ap21
peals. Even if a court of appeals grants authorization to a petitioner
to submit his successive petition for habeas relief to the district court,
the district court must dismiss the successive prayer “unless the applicant shows that the claim satisfies the requirements of [28 U.S.C.
22
§ 2244].”
1. Enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 2244
In 1948, citing the growing threat of “repetitious, meritless requests for relief,” Congress drafted 28 U.S.C. § 2244, which stated

17
18
19
20
21
22

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a) (exempting federal prisoners who seek habeas relief under 28
U.S.C. § 2255 from the restrictions imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244).
Id. § 2244(b)(1).
Id. § 2244(b)(2)(A).
Id. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii).
See id. § 2244(b)(3)(A). The specific procedure for reviewing a request to submit an
SSHP is also outlined within this provision. See id.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(4).
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that a federal court was not “required to entertain an application for
a writ of habeas corpus” from a state or federal prisoner if an SSHP
23
restated claims that the court had resolved in the original petition.
An attached Reviser’s Note asserts “[t]his section makes no material
change in existing practice. . . . [since] the courts have consistently
refused to entertain successive ‘nuisance’ applications for habeas
24
corpus.”
2. 1966 Amendments
In 1966, the statute was amended with the introduction of 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b), which allowed the federal courts to make a determination of the petitioner’s good faith when deciding whether to en25
tertain an SSHP. If the court believed that a petitioner had deliberately withheld an otherwise novel argument from the original habeas
petition, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) gave the court the authority to dismiss
26
the petition. The new amendments were designed to relieve the
perceived burden on the federal courts caused by the state prisoners
who “fil[e] applications either containing allegations identical to
those asserted in a previous application that has been denied, or predicated upon grounds obviously well known to them when they filed
27
the preceding application.” Legislative history accompanying the
1966 amendments still explicitly contemplated the good-faith discovery of new evidence “relating to an alleged denial of a [f]ederal
right,” and observed that, in such a case, “the court would be obliged
28
to entertain the writ.”

23

24
25

26
27

28

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 Revisor’s Note (1952) (originally enacted as Act of June 25, 1948, ch.
646, § 2244, 62 Stat. 869, 965). The fact that Congress codified the state exhaustion requirement at the same time as implementing the first restrictions on successive state petitions for habeas relief suggests that the state process has always been a specific point of
concern for the Legislature.
Id.
Habeas Corpus Act of 1966 § 1, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1970). The 1966 amendments to 28
U.S.C. § 2244 also introduced a provision which codified the district court’s deference to
conclusions of fact or law reached by the Supreme Court during the petitioner’s initial
round of appeals. See id. § 2244(c).
Id. § 2244(b).
S. REP. NO. 89-1797, at 2 (1966); see also id. at 1 (“The number of applications by State
prisoners for writs of habeas corpus has been steadily increasing [from 134 in 1941 to
3,773 in the first 9 months of fiscal year 1966]. . . . More than 95 percent of these applications were held to be without merit.”).
Id. at 2.
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3. 1996 Amendments (AEDPA)
During the 1996 Senate debates over AEDPA, the question of habeas reform seemed to take priority over discussion regarding any of
the provisions of the bill that were explicitly designed to prevent terrorist attacks. Earlier, the House of Representatives had removed a
number of counterterrorism provisions from AEDPA, particularly
29
those involving surveillance by intelligence agencies. In the absence
of these provisions, both AEDPA’s supporters and detractors agreed
30
that habeas reform was the primary purpose of the bill. AEDPA’s
supporters traced narratives of murderers who had delayed their ex31
ecutions through repeated meritless petitions for habeas relief. The
bill’s supporters also invoked the wishes of the families of the victims
of the Oklahoma City bombing, who were vocal in their desire for the
32
expedient execution of the accused bombers. Based on the legislative record accompanying 28 U.S.C. § 2244, there was a clear and targeted intent by Congress to close off certain paths to state prisoners
seeking habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
D. Habeas Rule 11
Habeas Rule 11 states that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
may be used with respect to habeas proceedings “to the extent that
29

30

31

32

See Labaton, supra note 4 (discussing that the Senate has “historically resisted approving
legislation that merely limited habeas corpus appeals by state and Federal inmates”).
This modification was a source of consternation for the Senate. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC.
7548–51 (1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (commiserating with Sen. Biden’s frustration
regarding the state of the bill); see also id. at 7567 (statement of Sen. Biden) (“That is what
this is about—35 folks in the House who do not like [a proposed wiretap provision].
That is why we are going to vote against our interest probably in the next couple of
hours.”).
Compare id. at 7550 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“Most important, this conference bill contains the habeas corpus reform proposal contained in the Senate terrorism bill.”) with id.
at 7552 (statement of Sen. Biden) (“This is a great habeas corpus bill. . . . This is a habeas
corpus bill with a little terrorism thrown in.”).
E.g., 142 CONG. REC. 7573–75 (statement of Sen. Gorton) (outlining a 12-year process
from conviction to execution for an accused murderer, and entering into the Record a
chronology of “57 separate actions” taken in the Federal courts with respect to that
process). But see id. at 7552 (statement of Sen. Biden) (contending that the vast majority
of delays occur in the state courts, beyond the reach of the proposed Federal statute).
See 142 CONG. REC. at 7564 (statement of Sen. Nickles) (“The No. 1 provision
that . . . [the victims’ families] want in this bill is the so-called habeas corpus reform.
They want an end to these endless appeals of people who have been convicted of atrocious crimes and murders.”). But see id. at 7552 (statement of Sen. Biden) (noting that
the trial of the Oklahoma City bombers was under way in federal court, and that the application of these reforms to their case would require the district attorney to delay a federal conviction and execution to try the defendants again in a state court).
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they are not inconsistent with any statutory provisions.” Because of
the limitations instituted by AEDPA, prisoners have invoked the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in an effort to preserve or expand their
access to habeas corpus; in practice, however, courts have been circumspect in applying the Federal Rules to habeas proceedings in
34
such a manner. This judicial restraint frustrates attempts to raise
untimely claims for habeas relief, which seems consistent with Congress’s intent in enacting AEDPA, and suggests that the courts should
take a somewhat narrow approach when faced with similar attempts
to apply the Federal Rules to habeas proceedings.
III. RULE 60(B) AS IT APPLIES TO HABEAS PROCEEDINGS
A. Conflicting Doctrines Regarding the Use of Rule 60(b) Motions in Habeas
Proceedings
In the wake of AEDPA’s passage, conflicting doctrines arose re35
garding Rule 60(b) should apply to habeas proceedings. For example, the Second Circuit found that, while a petition for habeas corpus
is a request for the court to declare a conviction invalid on Constitutional grounds, a Rule 60(b) motion “seeks only to vacate the federal
court judgment dismissing the habeas petition,” and is “merely a step
36
along the way” to habeas relief. Because the Second Circuit concluded that a Rule 60(b) motion is distinguishable from an SSHP, the
court recommended that petitioners be granted leave to file Rule
37
60(b) motions. At the other extreme, several circuits resolved that a
state prisoner could never invoke Rule 60(b) in response to a denied
petition for habeas corpus because the ultimate goal of a Rule 60(b)
motion is not a direct challenge to the habeas proceeding, but an in-

33
34

35
36
37

See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States District Court, R. 11, 28 U.S.C.
app. § 2254 (2006).
See, e.g., United States v. Duffus, 174 F.3d 333, 337 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that liberal
grants of “relation back” under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would
undermine the intent of Congress in passing AEDPA); see also Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S.
644, 655 (2005) (holding that a trial may not serve as a common transaction for Rule 15
relation back); Peterson v. Brennan, 196 F. App’x 135, 140 (3d Cir. 2006) (refusing to
treat a petitioner’s motion to supplement as an SSHP, but ultimately denying Rule 15 relation back and dismissing supplementary claims as untimely).
See Pridgen v. Shannon, 380 F.3d 721, 725–26 (3d Cir. 2004) (discussing the circuit split
on the issue).
See Rodriguez v. Mitchell, 252 F.3d 191, 198–99 (2d Cir. 2001).
This “always permitted” interpretation was not widely recognized, and was only advanced
by the Second Circuit. See Pridgen, 380 F.3d at 725 (discussing that the “Second Circuit
alone” has taken such a position).
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38

direct challenge to the underlying conviction. Because the motion
seeks to overturn the conviction, circuits that universally denied Rule
60(b) motions in response to denied petitions for habeas corpus saw
the effort as an attempt to circumvent the restrictions established by
39
AEDPA.
Most courts that flatly denied the use of Rule 60(b) in habeas proceedings relied on the holding of the Court of Appeals for the Ele40
venth Circuit in Felker v. Turpin. Felker appeared before the Eleventh
Circuit on remand from a Supreme Court case in which the Court affirmed the constitutionality of AEDPA’s restrictions on the writ of ha41
beas corpus. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that
AEDPA’s restrictions on SSHP constitute a “modified res judicata
rule” which restrain “abuse of the writ” but do not suspend habeas
42
corpus in violation of the Suspension Clause. The Supreme Court
also dismissed Felker’s petition for certiorari, holding that 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244 (b)(3) prevented the Court from reviewing a lower court’s de43
cision to deny a petitioner leave to file an SSHP.
Denied review by the Supreme Court, Felker filed two additional
petitions for habeas relief—both of which were denied by the district
44
court. After the district court denied his fourth application for habeas relief, Felker filed a Rule 60(b) motion in the district court, in45
voking subsections (1), (2), (3), and (6). On appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit panel held that “the established law of this circuit . . . forecloses . . . [petitioner’s] position that Rule 60(b) motions
46
are not constrained by successive petition rules.” With the Supreme
Court’s refusal to review the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, Felker be47
came an important precedent in habeas jurisprudence.
38

39

40
41
42
43
44
45

46
47

See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin (Felker II), 101 F.3d 657, 661 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam)
(“Rule 60(b) cannot be used to circumvent restraints on successive habeas petitions.”),
cert. denied, 519 U.S. 989 (1996).
Cf. Duffus, 174 F.3d at 337 (affirming the denial of a prisoner’s untimely amendment to a
habeas petition because granting leave to amend would frustrate the intent of AEDPA’s
one-year statute of limitations).
Felker II, 101 F.3d at 658.
Felker v. Turpin (Felker I), 518 U.S. 651, 651–52 (1996).
Felker II, 518 U.S. at 664 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 658–59. The Court also denied a direct prayer made to them for an original habeas
petition. Id. at 665.
Felker I, 101 F.3d at 659–60.
Id. at 660. Respectively, subsections (1), (2), (3), and (6) address claims of: mistake;
newly discovered evidence; fraud or misconduct by the opposing party; and “any other
reason that justifies relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
Felker I, 101 F.3d at 661.
See, e.g., Lopez v. Douglas, 141 F.3d 974, 975–76 (10th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (citing
Felker I to deny Petitioner’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion as an SSHP under AEDPA).
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Between these two extremes a third plurality view has emerged.
This plurality view distinguishes between “true” Rule 60(b) motions
that are designed to address procedural issues within the habeas proceeding, and masked attempts to “collaterally attack” the underlying
48
conviction through a Rule 60(b) motion.
This interpretation
represents a valid synthesis of the two extremes: legitimate Rule
60(b) motions do have an ultimate goal that is distinct from that of
an initial or successive petition for habeas corpus, while attempts to
disguise an SSHP as a Rule 60(b) motion serve only to frustrate the
intent of Congress in enacting AEDPA. Drawing a distinction between “legitimate” Rule 60(b) motions and masked successive habeas
petitions allows for the broad use of the rule, while ensuring that it is
only used for its legitimate intended purpose—to vacate the prior final judgment from which the motion originates, and not to overturn
an underlying criminal proceeding.
B. Development of a Doctrine of Distinction
In an early attempt to distinguish between legitimate Rule 60(b)
motions and masked successive habeas petitions, the Ninth Circuit
held in 1998 that a petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion was an SSHP but
suggested that, under certain circumstances, a Rule 60(b) motion
filed in response to a denied petition for habeas relief could evade
49
the restrictions of AEDPA. For example, if state misconduct pre-

48

49

See Pridgen v. Shannon, 380 F.3d 721, 727 (3d Cir. 2004) (affirming a lower court’s dismissal of portions of petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion which directly attacked state conviction); see also Banks v. United States, 167 F.3d 1082, 1084 (7th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)
(“Rule 60(b) is, however, an appropriate means to bring a claim that the conduct of
counsel affected the integrity of the court’s habeas proceeding.”).
See Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 921 n.3 (9th Cir. 1998), remanded from 523 U.S.
538, 540 (1998). But see id. at 927 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (“I doubt there could be any
form of papers seeking . . . federal relief from a state conviction and sentence, after federal relief had previously been denied, that would not fall within the statutory provisions
governing second or successive applications.”). Petitioner Thompson was convicted on
November 4, 1983 of first-degree murder and forcible rape. Calderon v. Thompson, 523
U.S. 538, 544 (1998). Petitioner’s convictions and death sentence were affirmed in the
California State Supreme Court on April 28, 1988. Id. From the time that his convictions
were affirmed, Thompson filed three consecutive applications for habeas relief. Id. at
544–45. In 1995, Petitioner’s third application was granted relief as to his rape conviction
and to a rape special circumstance (which made his death sentence invalid), but was denied relief as to his murder conviction. Id. at 545.
On June 19, 1996, a three-judge panel of the court of appeals reversed the district
court’s ruling, reinstating the rape conviction, the special circumstance, and the death
penalty; subsequently, Thompson filed a fourth habeas petition. Calderon, 523 U.S. at
545–46. On July 22, 1997, Thompson filed a motion with the court of appeals to recall its
mandate denying habeas relief, On July 23, he filed an additional motion in district court

Nov. 2010]

RULE 60(b) IN HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

217

vented a Petitioner from discovering evidence which might provide a
factual predicate for a permissible SSHP under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(2), the court observed that it would be “incongruous” to
treat a Rule 60(b) motion raising that claim as an SSHP: a petition
under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 would be insufficient, because (a) the petitioner would not be in possession of the evidence in question; and
(b) the State would have an incentive to shirk its disclosure obliga50
tions.
Four years after Calderon v. Thompson suggested that a court might
entertain a Rule 60(b) motion in the context of a habeas proceeding,
a dissenting opinion in the Eleventh Circuit outlined a more workable framework by which to determine whether Rule 60(b) motions
should be treated as SSHP subject to the restrictions of 28 U.S.C. §
51
2244. In Mobley v. Head, the majority stayed the execution of a petitioner pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Abdur’Rahman v.
52
Bell. Notwithstanding the pending Supreme Court decision, the ma-

50
51
52

seeking relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b). Id. at 546. The district court denied this Rule 60(b) motion as an SSHP. Id. at 547. The court of appeals first denied
Thompson’s motion to recall its mandate, but reversed its decision, sua sponte, two days
before the scheduled date of Thompson’s execution. Id. at 547–48. The court of appeals
also affirmed the district court’s earlier grant of habeas relief, vacating Thompson’s death
sentence. Id. at 549.
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the recall of the mandate did not conflict with the provisions of AEDPA, because the court of appeals had “acted on the exclusive basis of Thompson’s first federal habeas petition.” Id. at 554 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244
(b) (Supp. II 1994)). The Court ultimately held, however, that the court of appeals had
abused its discretion since the “miscarriage of justice” standard was not met in Thompson’s case. Id. at 566 (“Thompson’s evidence does not meet the ‘more likely than not’
showing necessary to vacate his stand-alone conviction of rape, much less the ‘clear and
convincing’ showing necessary to vacate his sentence of death.”).
On remand, the Ninth Circuit reinstated the mandate, but also granted Thompson’s
motion to reinstate the appeal of his Rule 60(b) motion, which had been dismissed as
moot after the mandate had initially been recalled. Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d at 920.
See Thompson, 151 F.3d at 921 n.3.
306 F.3d 1096 (11th Cir. 2002).
535 U.S. 1016 (2002) (granting certiorari), cert. dismissed, 537 U.S. 88 (2002). In Abdur’Rahman, the petitioner had filed a petition for habeas relief raising claims of ineffective counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. The district court granted habeas relief on
the ineffective counsel claim, but denied as procedurally barred his claim of prosecutorial
misconduct. Abdur’Rahman v. Bell, 537 U.S. 88, 89 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(withdrawing certiorari). The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting
habeas relief (petitioner did not appeal denial of relief on the second claim). Id. (citing
226 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2000)). Petitioner then filed a Rule 60(b) motion, claiming that
the procedural bar ruling of the district court was based on a mistaken premise, citing
TENN. SUP. CT. R. 39. See id. at 92. The district court held that the Rule 60(b) motion
represented a “second or successive application,” and the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower
court’s decision. Id. at 93–94. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but later withdrew
it as improvidently granted. See id.
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jority opined that the lower court had “fairly read” Felker’s absolute
prohibition on the use of Rule 60(b) motions in the context of ha53
beas proceedings.
In his dissent, Judge Gerald Tjoflat argued that the majority was
wrong to rely on Felker because Felker involved an attempt to introduce
54
new constitutional claims into a habeas corpus petition. Judge Tjoflat read Felker’s conclusion that Rule 60(b) motions are barred unconditionally by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) within the context of that court’s
interest in preventing the circumvention of AEDPA’s restrictions on
55
successive habeas petitions. “True” Rule 60(b) motions, Judge Tjof56
lat argued, do not implicate these concerns. Judge Tjoflat observed
that an SSHP will either cite claims arising from an intervening rule
of constitutional law, or claims arising from the discovery of evidence
previously unavailable through the exercise of due diligence: neither
type of claim “challenges the district court’s previous denial of relief
57
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” A petitioner seeking relief under Rule
60(b), however, “impugn[s] . . . the integrity of the district court’s
judgment rejecting his petition . . . . Asserting this claim is quite different from contending, as the petitioner would in a successive habeas corpus petition, that his conviction or sentence was obtained
58
[unconstitutionally pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254].”
The impact of Judge Tjoflat’s reasoning in the Mobley dissent was
felt almost immediately, as his analysis was quoted approvingly by Justice Stevens in his dissent from the Supreme Court’s withdrawal of
59
certiorari in Abdur’Rahman.

53

54
55
56
57
58
59

Mobley, 306 F.3d at 1096 (citing Felker v. Turpin, 101 F.3d 657 (11th Cir. 1996) as a
“bright-line rule” applying § 2244 (b) restrictions to all Rule 60(b) motions filed in response to a denial of habeas relief).
See id. at 1098 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1102.
Id.
Id. at 1100–01 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b)(2)).
Id. at 1101.
Abdur’Rahman v. Bell, 537 U.S. 88, 95–96 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Mobley, 306 F.3d at 1100–05). In his dissent, Justice Stevens asserted that Judge Tjoflat’s reasoning was “fully consistent” with earlier Supreme Court decisions. See Abdur’Rahman, 537
U.S. at 96 (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000); Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal,
523 U.S. 637 (1998)).
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C. The Eleventh Circuit Decision in Gonzalez v. Secretary for the
Department of Corrections
After the Supreme Court withdrew certiorari in Abdur’Rahman, the
Eleventh Circuit joined Mobley with two other cases for rehearing en
60
banc. The first joined case, Lazo v. United States, was a 2002 decision
in which a federal prisoner invoked Rule 60(b) in an attempt to va61
cate the denial of his request for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. After this motion was denied, he attempted to file an appeal with the
Eleventh Circuit. Distinguishing between a habeas petition that
sought to overturn a conviction or sentence and a Rule 60(b) motion
that sought only to narrowly attack some defect in the actual habeas
proceeding, the panel concluded that the petitioner’s motion, as presented, was “the functional equivalent of a successive § 2255 mo62
tion.” Accordingly, the panel required that Lazo obtain a certificate
63
of appealability before challenging his denied Rule 60(b) motion.
The second joined case involved Aurelio Gonzalez, a Florida state
64
prisoner serving ninety-nine years for robbery with a firearm. Citing
an intervening Supreme Court decision, Aurelio Gonzalez filed a
Rule 60(b) motion in 2001 seeking relief from a district court deci65
sion dismissing his habeas petition as time-barred. The district court
66
denied Gonzalez’s Rule 60(b) motion in 2002. Although the district
court denied Gonzalez a certificate of appealability, the Eleventh Cir67
cuit agreed to review the district court’s decision. The appellate
court concluded that Gonzalez’s appeal sought relief not from the
dismissal of his habeas petition, but from the denial of his Rule 60(b)
motion; accordingly, the court held that Gonzalez needed a certificate of appealability properly directed to any issues arising from the
68
2002 order before the court could review that decision. Reviewing
Gonzalez’s Rule 60(b) motion as a prayer for relief from the district

60
61

62
63
64
65

66
67
68

See Gonzalez v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr. (Gonzalez I), 366 F.3d 1253, 1253 (11th Cir.
2004).
Lazo v. United States, 314 F.3d 571, 575 (11th Cir. 2002) (denying a certificate of appealability), vacated for reh’g en banc sub nom. Gonzalez v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 326 F.3d
1175 (11th Cir. 2003).
Lazo, 314 F.3d at 573, cited in Gonzalez I, 366 F.3d at 1260.
Gonzalez I, 366 F.3d at 1260.
Id. at 1260–61.
Id. at 1261. The district court had originally granted Gonzalez a certificate of appealability; the certificate was denied on review after the court of appeals vacated and remanded
for clarification. Id.
Gonzalez I, 366 F.3d at 1261.
Id.
Id.
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court’s dismissal of his habeas petition, the Eleventh Circuit panel
concluded that the intervening Supreme Court decision was not a va69
lid ground for Rule 60(b) relief. Unlike Lazo, in which the court
had read the petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion as a “masked” SSHP, the
panel in Gonzalez v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections (Gonzalez I)
relied on Mobley to assert that “in the post-AEDPA era all Rule 60(b)
motions are to be treated as second or successive petitions,” and
70
therefore subject to the blanket prohibition championed by Felker.
En banc, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that “[d]espite the clothing Lazo put on it,” his Rule 60(b) motion was, in fact, a successive
habeas petition since “it does not concern a defect in the earlier
§ 2255 proceeding . . . . [but] attacks the underlying judgment of
conviction and sentence itself on grounds not asserted in the prior
71
§ 2255 proceeding.” By contrast, motions which properly seek to set
aside the prior denial of habeas corpus “on a traditional Rule 60(b)
ground for relief from a prior judgment” were not held to be succes72
sive habeas petitions. For the purpose of appellate review, however,
the distinction was moot: the panel concluded that 28 U.S.C. § 2253
(c)(1) required that a petitioner obtain a certificate of appealability
before seeking review of any final judgment in a habeas context, in73
cluding a denial of a Rule 60(b) motion.
The court then attempted to reframe the debate, holding that
Rule 60(b), in its complete form, was inconsistent with the provisions
74
of 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b). The court first affirmed that the primary
intent of Congress in drafting AEDPA “was to ensure greater finality
of state and federal court judgments in criminal cases,” in part
75
through the restrictions placed on SSHP. A broad application of
Rule 60(b), they argued, would effectively undermine Congress’s in-

69
70
71

72
73

74
75

Id. at 1262.
Id. (emphasis added). The panel also argued that, under existing pre-AEDPA circuit law,
Gonzalez’s motion would have been denied, even in the absence of Mobley. Id.
Id. at 1263 (citing Lazo v. United States, 314 F.3d 571, 572–73 (11th Cir. 2002)). The
court of appeals in Gonzalez held that their decision regarding the application of Rule
60(b) motions to habeas proceedings should be applied equally to petitions originally
made under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, as well as those made under § 2254. Id. at 1262.
Gonzalez I, 366 F.3d. at 1263.
“By its plain terms the § 2253(c)(1) certificate of appealability requirement applies to
‘the final order’ in a § 2254 or § 2255 proceeding, and Rule 60(b) motions have been
considered final orders for appellate purposes in other types of proceedings.” Id. at 1263
(citations omitted).
Id. at 1270; see also Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States District Court, R.
11, 28 U.S.C. app. § 2254 (2006).
Gonzalez I, 366 F.3d at 1269.
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76

tent in passing these restrictions. The solution to this inconsistency,
in the opinion of the Eleventh Circuit panel, was to restrict the authority of the courts to consider Rule 60(b) motions in habeas proceedings to situations where the motion “is filed to correct a clerical
mistake (meaning that it is really a Rule 60(a) motion),” or where the
motion asserts claims of fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by
77
the state pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3).
Judge Tjoflat, concurring in part and dissenting in part, first observed that under the majority’s formulation the courts would treat
“any motion based on . . . [Rule 60(b) grounds other than a 60(b)(3)
claim of prosecutorial fraud or misconduct] as an . . . [SSHP] even if
78
the motion contains no constitutional claim at all.” The majority opinion
would also require an applicant to seek a certificate of appealability
79
in order to appeal the denial of a Rule 60(b)(3) motion. “[R]ather
than adopting a flexible rule that would permit district courts to
honor AEDPA’s aims without punishing the true Rule 60(b) mo80
vants,” the court had failed to recognize that Rule 60(b) had been
implemented, in part, to establish a method of relief distinct from
81
independent actions (such as habeas petitions). The majority had
ignored that history, Judge Tjoflat argued, and had therefore undermined the intended distinction between the relief sought under a
Rule 60(b) motion and the relief sought through a petition for ha82
beas corpus. Instead, Judge Tjoflat relied on his dissent in Mobley to
demand that a distinction be drawn between authentic Rule 60(b)
motions and attempts to disguise SSHP as Rule 60(b) motions:
An SSHP, “like all habeas corpus petitions, is meant to remedy constitutional violations (albeit ones which arise out of facts discovered or laws
evolved after an initial habeas corpus proceeding), while a Rule 60(b)
motion is designed to cure procedural violations in an earlier proceed-

76
77
78
79
80

81

82

Compare id. with United States v. Duffus, 174 F.3d 333, 337 (3d Cir. 1999).
Gonzalez I, 366 F.3d at 1285–86.
Id. at 1288 (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 1297; see also id. at 1286 (Edmonson, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(“[T]he view of Tjoflat, J.] seems more correct to me because it leaves Rule 60 more intact as
well as crediting AEDPA.” (emphasis added)).
“The drafters of modern Rule 60(b) were unconcerned with ‘the substantive law as to the
grounds for vacating judgments.’ Rather, they sought to create a comprehensive procedural scheme, one that would ‘remove the uncertainties and historical limitations of ancient remedies while preserving all of the various kinds of relief that they afforded.” Gonzalez I, 366 F.3d at 1290 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1288.

222

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 13:1

ing—here, a habeas corpus proceeding—that raises questions about that
83
proceeding’s integrity.”
84

In his dissent, Judge Tjoflat also relied on Rodwell v. Pepe, in
which the First Circuit refused to “subscribe to a ‘one size fits all’ taxonomy,” and instead ruled that a Rule 60(b) motion should be permitted where the factual predicate addresses “some irregularity or
procedural defect in the procurement of the judgment denying ha85
beas relief.” Where the factual predicate of a motion attacks the
constitutionality of the conviction, the First Circuit determined, the
motion “threatens to encroach upon the precincts patrolled by the
86
AEDPA,” and must be dismissed as an SSHP. Using similar reasoning, Judge Tjoflat argued that applicants seeking review of a final
judgment on a Rule 60(b) motion did not need to obtain a certificate
of appealability because “final orders denying a Rule 60(b) motion
do not adjudicate a constitutional challenge to the movant’s conviction or sentence,” and therefore do not encroach on “precincts pa87
trolled by the AEDPA.”
D. Gonzalez v. Crosby
After the Eleventh Circuit decision in Gonzalez I, Aurelio Gonzalez
sought and was granted certiorari. As a threshold matter, although
the lower court decision was intended to apply equally to prisoners
seeking habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 2255, the
Supreme Court’s 7-2 opinion explicitly limited its holding to those
Rule 60(b) motions filed by state prisoners denied relief under
88
§ 2254. The Court first focused on the word “applications” as used
in 28 U.S.C. § 2244, concluding “it is clear that for purposes of
§ 2244(b) an ‘application’ for habeas relief is a filing that contains
89
one or more ‘claims.’” Analogizing the use of the term “applica-

83

84
85
86
87
88

89

Id. at 1292 (quoting Mobley v. Head, 306 F.3d 1096, 1101 (11th Cir. 2002) (Tjoflat, J.,
dissenting)); see also id. at 1297 (“[W]e should recognize that Rule 60(b) survives in
AEDPA’s wake and fashion a holding that accounts for the essential differences between
Rule 60(b) motions and [successive habeas petitions].”).
324 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2003).
Id. at 70.
Id. at 71.
Gonzalez I, 366 F.3d at 1299; Rodwell, 324 F.3d at 71.
Compare Gonzalez I, 366 F.3d at 1262 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[T]here is no material difference
in the relevant statutory language [between § 2254 and § 2255].”) with Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 529, n.3 (2005) (“Although [the portion of § 2255 governing
SSHP] . . . is similar to, and refers to, the statutory subsection applicable to second or
successive § 2254 petitions, it is not identical.”).
Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 530.
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tion” in other provisions of the United States Code, as well as the
Court’s own use of the term in an earlier case involving § 2254(d),
the majority determined that “[t]hese statutes, and our own decisions, make clear that a ‘claim’ as used in § 2244(b) is an asserted fed90
eral basis for relief from a state court’s judgment of conviction.” To
conclude otherwise, the Court held, “circumvents AEDPA’s requirement that a new claim be dismissed unless it relies on either a new
91
rule of constitutional law or newly discovered facts.” The Court observed that various appellate courts, when faced with nominal Rule
60(b) motions, consistently treated them as SSHP where they asserted
92
such federal bases for relief. “[L]ike all habeas corpus petitions,”
these federal bases of relief were “meant to remedy constitutional violations (albeit ones which arise out of facts discovered or law evolved
93
after an initial habeas corpus proceeding).” While the majority never mentioned Judge Tjoflat in their opinion, the definition of “claim”
adopted by the Supreme Court in Gonzalez is consistent with the definition developed by Judge Tjoflat in identifying masked Rule 60(b)
motions, which are ultimately intended to address “constitutional
94
claims by prisoners.”
Having adopted a workable definition of “claim,” the Court then
turned to the question of whether a Rule 60(b) motion advances a
claim, requiring the motion to be read as a successive habeas petition
(and therefore held to § 2244 (b)’s restrictions). In most cases, the
95
Court observed, the determination will not present a challenge. In
closer cases, the Court suggested that a motion attacking a court’s
decision on a claim should itself be treated as a claim, where the targeted decision was reached on the merits: “[A]lleging that the court
erred in denying habeas relief on the merits,” the Court reasoned, “is
effectively indistinguishable from alleging that the movant
96
is . . . entitled to habeas relief.” On the other hand, “[i]f neither the
motion itself nor the federal judgment from which it seeks relief sub-

90
91
92

93
94
95
96

Id. (emphasis added) (citing Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 207 (2003)).
Id. at 531.
See id. (citing Harris v. United States, 367 F.3d 74, 80–81 (2d Cir. 2004) (Rule 60(b)(1)
claim arising from counsel’s failure to raise a Sixth Amendment claim in the initial petition); Rodwell v. Pepe, 324 F.3d at 66 (Rule 60(b)(2) claim arising from newly discovered
evidence); Dunlap v. Litscher, 301 F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 2002) (Rule 60(b)(6) claim arising
from an intervening change in substantive law)).
Mobley v. Head, 306 F.3d 1096, 1101 (11th Cir. 2002) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting).
Id.
“A motion that seeks to add a new ground for relief . . . will of course qualify [as an
SSHP].” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532 (citing Harris, 367 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 2004)).
Id. at 532.
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stantially addresses federal grounds for setting aside the movant’s
state conviction,” the Court saw no conflict between the goals of
97
AEDPA and those of Rule 60(b). In linking the word “claim” to the
assertions made in nominal Rule 60(b) motions, the Court almost
explicitly restated the distinction drawn by Judge Tjoflat in both Mob98
ley and Gonzalez I, without referring to him or to his earlier opinions.
99
Finally, the majority turned to Calderon v. Thompson, on which the
Eleventh Circuit relied in order to support the notion that Rule
100
60(b) was “inconsistent and irreconcilable with AEDPA’s purpose.”
The Eleventh Circuit panel had analogized Calderon’s discussion of a
court’s authority to recall a mandate to the use of Rule 60(b) before
them, concluding that “[t]he unfettered application of either procedure” in habeas cases would “undermine . . . important principles
101
and values” protected by AEDPA. The Supreme Court rejected this
analogy: while Calderon did state that “a prisoner’s motion to recall
the mandate on the basis of the merits of the underlying decision can be
regarded as a second or successive application,” the Court found that
this statement did not conflict with its understanding that a Rule
60(b) motion challenging a federal court denial on the merits should
102
be treated as a successive habeas petition. Because Gonzalez’s motion “challenges only the District Court’s previous ruling on the
AEDPA statute of limitations,” the Court ruled “it is not the equiva103
lent of a successive habeas petition.” The Court affirmed the “unquestionably valid role” that Rule 60(b) may play in habeas cases, and
noted “several characteristics of Rule 60(b) motion[s]” that eased the
conflict between the Rule and § 2244 and that would insulate the
97
98

99
100
101
102
103

Id. at 533.
Compare Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532 (distinguishing situations in which “a Rule 60(b) motion
attacks, not the substance of the federal court’s resolution of a claim on its merits, but
some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings.” (emphasis added)) with Gonzalez I,
366 F.3d 1253, 1253 (11th Cir. 2004) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (“[A] Rule 60(b) motion is
designed to cure procedural violations in an earlier proceeding . . . that raises questions
about that proceeding’s integrity.” (quoting Mobley, 306 F.3d at 1101 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting)) and Mobley, 306 F.3d at 1101 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (identifying a true Rule 60(b)
motion as “impugning the integrity of the district court’s judgment rejecting . . . [movant’s] petition”).
523 U.S. 538 (1998).
Gonzalez I, 366 F.3d at 1271.
Id. at 1275.
Calderon, 523 U.S. at 553, quoted in Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 534.
Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535–36. Although the Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Gonzalez I, the majority opinion still affirmed the Eleventh Circuit’s judgment in
the case, since the Court found that the intervening Supreme Court decision which had
inspired Gonzalez’s Rule 60(b) motion did not meet the “extraordinary circumstances”
standard required for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6). Id. at 538.
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courts from “an avalanche of frivolous postjudgment motions”: (1)
Rule 60(b)’s own time limitations; (2) the high evidentiary threshold
of “extraordinary circumstances” required from a movant seeking relief under the “catchall” provision of Rule 60(b)(6); and (3) the limited and deferential appellate review available for Rule 60(b) pro104
ceedings.
Concurring with the majority opinion, Justice Breyer approvingly
cited Judge Tjoflat’s dissenting opinion in Gonzalez I, observing that it
was consistent with the majority’s understanding of the proper limits
105
of a true Rule 60(b) motion. He wrote separately, however, to underscore the distinction between Rule 60(b) motions designed to attack the merits of a lower court decision, and those intended to address issues with the integrity of the process, fearing that the Court’s
decision to deconstruct the word “claim” would only serve to cloud
106
While dissenting on other grounds, Justice Stevens emthe issue.
braced the majority’s refusal to narrowly restrict the use of Rule 60(b)
motions only to those alleging Rule 60(b)(3) fraud, misrepresenta107
tion, or misconduct.
IV. PHELPS V. ALAMEIDA

108

AND THE BROADER IMPACT OF GONZALEZ

In response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gonzalez, federal
courts have worked to determine whether a Rule 60(b) motion seeking relief from a final judgment in habeas proceedings actually advances a claim on the merits, or whether it seeks to attack “some de109
fect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings.”
A Ninth
104
105
106

107
108
109

Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 534–35 (citing scenarios implicating Rules 60(b)(1) and (4)).
Id. at 538 (Breyer, J., concurring).
See id. at 538–39 (“I fear that other language in the majority’s opinion, especially its discussion of the significance of the word ‘claim,’ could be taken to imply a different standard, with which I would disagree.”).
Id. at 539 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Ultimately, Justice Stevens argued that the Court had
overstepped in addressing the merits of Gonzalez’s Rule 60(b) motion. Id.
Phelps v. Alameida, 569 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1072
(2010).
See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532; see e.g., Spitznas v. Boone, 464 F.3d 1213, 1225 (10th Cir.
2006) (treating petitioner’s appeal of a district court’s ruling as a “true” Rule 60(b) motion, because the motion did not attack the substance of the district court’s ruling, but rather the lower court’s “failure to make any ruling on a claim that was properly presented”); see also Ward v. Norris, 577 F.3d 925, 932 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Although an
assertion of ineffective assistance of habeas counsel may be characterized as a defect in
the integrity of the habeas proceeding, it ultimately seeks to assert or reassert substantive
claims with the assistance of new counsel.”). But see Post v. Bradshaw, 422 F.3d 419, 424–
25 (6th Cir. 2005) (“It makes no difference that the [Rule 60(b)] motion itself . . . purports to raise a defect in the integrity of the habeas proceedings, . . . all that
matters is that . . . [Petitioner] is . . . advanc[ing] a claim by taking steps that lead inexor-
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Circuit decision whose procedural history straddles both sides of the
Gonzalez divide illustrates this effort. In 1994, Kevin Phelps was convicted of murder in a California state court after two previous trials
110
had concluded in hung juries. After exhausting his remedies in the
state courts, including a state habeas process, Phelps sought federal
habeas relief in 1998: one year and fifteen days after the California
State Supreme Court filed its decision not to review Phelps’s denied
111
state habeas petition. The district court ruled that Phelps’s petition
was untimely under AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations, finding
that the California State Supreme Court’s denial of review had be112
come final on that court’s filing date. The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court’s opinion in an unpublished memorandum on Jan113
uary 26, 1999.
In 2001, fifteen months after Phelps’s appeal became final, the Ninth Circuit resolved conclusively that a California
court’s decision not to review a denied state habeas petition did not
become final until thirty days after the court’s filing date; therefore,
114
Phelps’s federal habeas petition was not untimely.
Because the Ninth Circuit’s ruling meant that Phelps’s original
petition had been improperly dismissed, Phelps filed a Rule 60(b)
motion asking that the district court review their earlier dismissal “in
115
light of the intervening change in the law.”
The district court interpreted Phelps’s Rule 60(b) motion as an SSHP and, because
Phelps had not obtained permission from the court of appeals before
116
filing, dismissed the motion for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
After the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Gonzalez, Phelps again
asked the district court to review its original decision to dismiss his
habeas petition as untimely, “a dismissal that by this point was predi117
cated on two indisputably erroneous legal rulings.”
The district

110
111
112

113
114
115
116

117

ably to a merits-based attack on the prior dismissal of his habeas petition.” (alteration in
original)).
Phelps, 569 F.3d at 1124.
Id. at 1125.
Id. Under California law, “decisions” of the California Supreme Court become final thirty
days after they are filed, while “orders” become final on the day that they are filed. The
district court acknowledged that, in this context, the state courts had not “clearly articulated” a distinction between decisions and orders. Id. at 1126. Nevertheless, the district
court accepted the State’s argument that the denial of review was, in fact, an order. Id.
Phelps, 569 F.3d at 1126.
Id. at 1127 (citing Bunney v. Mitchell, 262 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)).
Id.
Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)). Improperly relying on an analysis of the merits by the
district court, a panel of the Ninth Circuit dismissed Phelps’s certificate of appealability
regarding this decision as improvidently granted. Id. at 1127–28.
Phelps, 569 F.3d at 1128.
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court denied Phelps’s request for reconsideration, and denied him a
certificate of appealability to seek review of this denied request for
118
Phelps sought a certificate of appealability from
reconsideration.
119
the Ninth Circuit, which was initially denied. Eventually, however,
the Ninth Circuit granted Phelps reconsideration of this most recent
decision, and ultimately granted him a certificate of appealability as
to whether his circumstances were sufficiently “extraordinary” to sup120
port a grant of relief under FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6).
The Ninth Circuit panel reversed the district court’s denial of
Phelps’s motion for reconsideration as to whether his federal habeas
petition was untimely. The panel expressed alarm that “a concern for
procedure has far too often obscured or eclipsed the equally important if not greater role to be played by our dedication to justice,” and
declared that “Phelps’ case represents the epitome of our obsession
121
with form over substance.”
The Ninth Circuit concluded that
Phelps’s motion for reconsideration before the district court did describe “extraordinary circumstances,” and remanded the case with instructions that “the decision to grant Rule 60(b)(6) relief must be
measured by the incessant command of the court’s conscience that
122
justice be done in light of all the facts.” The Ninth Circuit decision
in Phelps recognizes the considerations of equity contemplated by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzalez, and seems more in line with
123
the considerations that informed pre-AEDPA cases.
V. CONCLUSION
In both wording and legislative context, the AEDPA demonstrates
a clear intent to restrict the ability of state prisoners to repeatedly
seek the reversal of their state court convictions in the federal court
system. If too broadly read, however, the provisions of § 2244 would
overreach that Congressional purpose: such a reading would block
not only potentially abusive attacks on an underlying conviction, but
would also bar state prisoners from raising legitimate concerns arising from the habeas process itself. In trying to balance these apparently conflicting interests, the Eleventh Circuit in Gonzalez I drew the
118
119
120
121
122
123

Id.
Id. at 1129.
Id.
Id. at 1141.
Id. at 1137–1141 (quoting Stokes v. Williams, 475 F.3d 732, 736 (6th Cir. 2007)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 22 (1962) (“An applicant for . . . [collateral
relief] ought not to be held to the niceties of lawyers’ pleadings.”).
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line too narrowly, defining legitimacy within too strict a statutory
framework. By contrast, the Supreme Court decision in Gonzalez v.
Crosby provides for a slightly more permissive examination of the exact relief sought in a nominal Rule 60(b) motion. As a result, Gonzalez provides a slightly broader framework for relief, addressing concerns of equity particularly in those cases where “life or liberty is at
124
stake.” At the same time, Gonzalez’s “claim” definition prevents Rule
60(b) from providing grounds for relief that would serve to address
the underlying conviction, thereby undermining the express purpose
of 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

124

Id. at 8.

